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UNSTABLE IDENTITIES: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the run up to the Brighton Conference the UK Parliament held a hearing with the 
then President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Sir Nicolas Bratza. The 
hearing offers a glimpse into the two competing views of international courts through which 
the ECtHR is forced to navigate, the view of the Court as an international body and as a court 
tasked with “doing” law, albeit in a very specific subject matter. When asked about whether 
he would support an inclusion of a provision in the Brighton declaration of opening a 
dialogue between judges of the Court with national parliaments Sir Nicolas responded that 
“national judges are [the] natural partners [of the Court] in the sense that their role is […] 
essentially the same as ours—namely to interpret and apply the Convention rights.”1 
However, the tame words of “interpret and apply” did not seem to calm the fears of some the 
parliamentarians for where they saw the problem with the Court is not that it was interpreting 
and applying the Convention, but that it was doing so dynamically. Sir Nicholas’ answer was 
one of puzzlement, that there was no magic in the term ‘living instrument’2 and that “[i]t does 
not seem to me that the interpretive exercise that we carry out is different in substance from 
the role of national courts, either in developing the common law or indeed in updating 
statutes”.3 Moreover “just like the development of the common law, our [the Court’s] 
development has equally been incremental”.4 Again, this comparison of the ECtHR to a 
normal court did not placate the UK MPs for their view is that the Court is not a court proper 
but an international institution which presents problems since it is neither part of a UK 
governing structure (separation of powers issue) nor accountable to the UK Parliament or its 
citizens. This was not a controversial issue for Sir Nicholas since what the Court is is a court 
tasked with interpreting and applying the law, using legal technics and doctrines to decide 
cases and its actions are indistinguishable from any other high court – hence uncontroversial. 
How else would a court act like? 
It is not surprising that there was no common understanding between the two sides for 
they start from fundamentally different notions of what the ECtHR and its role is and this 
fundamental difference in understanding presents a problem when the Court justifies and 
legitimizes its decisions. But this split in identity does not only present a problem of 
argumentation and legitimization but it also influences the way that the Court sees and 
interprets convention rights depending on what identity it wears; and when it wears more than 
one identity – when its members and its audience understand its function and its role in 
fundamentally different ways the result is unstable and messy interpretations that have 
problems fitting into either world view. 
All legal systems work under a master narrative – the self-conception of most actors 
of the system itself. A master narrative is a short and simple story. It is a story about the 
system itself; “a governing underlying narrative that each legal system tells itself – more and 
less openly – about why it is constructed the way it is, why it operates as it does, and why this 
                                                 
1
 Oral Evidence Taken Before the Joint Committee on Human Rights, House of Lords, House of Commons, 
Doc. No. HC 873-iii, 13 March 2012, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
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3
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4
 Ibid. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474131 
makes good sense.”5 A master narrative is the underlying premise upon which any legal 
system is based. It is a simple story because it paints the system in quick broad brushstrokes 
(e.g. democratic polity with separation of powers with checks and balances) and at (most) 
times is oblivious to the paradoxes within it. Furthermore, a master narrative is important for 
legitimization purposes because the actors’ legitimacy will depend on their conformity with 
the system’s master narrative. Therefore, legitimacy is self-referential; the yardsticks for a 
legitimate action are contained within the system’s master narrative, not outside of it. 
Venzke, in his account of how actors and courts compete over sematic authority, argues that 
this process of building and maintaining authority is accomplished through the different 
actors’ attempts at connecting their current interpretations with past practices, histories and 
values – in essence legitimizing their decisions by creating “content laden reference points” 
connecting the past to the present while trying to influence the future.
6
 Consequently, when 
talking about the different international courts it is important to remember that they are 
embedded within a master narrative that is contextual and contingent and, at different points, 
more or less contested; in short their argumentation ultimately depends on an account of a 
“good life”.7 
It is not new in law to talk about some sort of structure of argumentation that keeps 
the legal decisions if not completely predictable then within the confines of well determined 
placeholders and positions. Talking about law generally, with the rise of formalism or 
positivism as the dominant narrative in law, the main line of argumentation has been to 
portray the law (and the people practicing it) as separate from doing morality and not 
beholden to mere interpretations while ultimately relying on both to make decisions.
8
 
Similarly in international law argumentation is structured by ascending (based on state 
consent and practice) and descending (based on morality) arguments ultimately settled by 
moral/political considerations.
9
 The argument in this papers runs in similar but different lines 
– it is not that the argumentation used by the Court does not follow ascending or descending 
lines of argument or that it manages to stay clear from either morality or interpretation but 
rather the idea is that the Court has a split identity where each identity comes with its own 
version of ascending and descending arguments and different notions of the good life and the 
proper order of things which creates problems of both outcomes of interpretation and type of 
legitimization. 
This paper deals with the issue of contested narratives, or as Robinson has put it, court 
identities
10
 – of narratives that are vying for supremacy in the ECtHR and how the Court’s 
split identity influences its interpretations and the margin of appreciation doctrine 
                                                 
5Mitchel De S. O. L'e Lasser, ‘Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System’ (1995) 
104 The Yale Law Journal 1325; Mitchel De S. O. L'e Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis 
of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press 2009); Mitchel De S. O. L'e Lasser, 
‘Transforming Deliberations’ in NIck Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of 
Highest Court's Rulings: Judicial Deliberations and Beyond (Cambridge University Press 2009) p. 37. 
6
 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists 
(Oxford University Press 2012) p. 49-60; Ingo Venzke, ‘Understanding the Authority of International Courts 
and Tribunals: On Delegation and Discursive Construction’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
(forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269648). 
7
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart 2011) p. 35-62. 
8
 Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a Good Thing, Too (Oxford University Press 
1994) p. 141-179; but also see Michel Rosenfeld, Just Interpretations: Law between Ethics and Politics 
(University of California Press 1998) p. 33-54. 
9
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New Epilogue (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
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 Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 925. 
specifically. In the tradition of Stanley Fish
11
 this is an exploration into an interpretative 
community
12
 – the European Court of Human Rights – and how the contemporary transition 
of the international law master-narrative from a nation-centred to a post-national legal order 
shapes the interpretations of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
While we have a good idea of what courts should do in nation-centred system, we still do not 
have a settled narrative about how the post-national landscape is supposed to look like.
13
 
There are certainly several narratives
14
 vying for our attention but none of them has become 
the dominant, the master-narrative if you will. In short, we are at a verge of a paradigm shift 
but rather than having a clear replacement we have several competing ones. This article will 
explore the consequences of such a paradigm shift on the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation and its interpretation at the ECtHR.  
I chose the margin of appreciation doctrine as an example because its origins are fairly 
old and one would think that by now it would have developed into a mature and well settled 
doctrine. It has not. “The concept of the margin of appreciation has become as slippery and 
elusive as an eel. Again and again the Court now appears to use the margin of appreciation as 
a substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.”15  These words are even truer 
today than when they were uttered back in 1996. Judge De Meyer has said that “it is high 
time for the Court to banish that [margin of appreciation] concept from its reasoning”16  back 
in 1997, albeit citing not only its circumlocution, which was evident at the time, but also the 
stench of relativism that it brought with it. Recently it has been said that the margin possess 
“a variable geometry”17, that it is a “threat to the rule of law”18 and that is a doctrine that has 
no more and no less than 7 factors that determine its width
19
; that it is a doctrine of deference 
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2013). 
18
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that possess at least four second order factors/reasons that can either be pro or against 
deference.
20
 It is anything but a well-settled doctrine.  
The phrase “margin of appreciation” does not exist in a vacuum, when uttered it is 
done so with a specific intention in mind and that intention is to give deference to an entity, 
in this case by the ECtHR towards national organs. The problem arises when the next set of 
questions (how much and why) are posed, for the answers supplied by the two factions are 
incompatible; one wants to give a “margin” because the organ in question has a certain 
amount of discretion (since it is the one that originally has to weigh facts and norms, or 
because it is within its legal sphere of competences) while the other wants to give that same 
margin because the organ in question belongs to a sovereign state and it would not be for the 
ECtHR as an international institution to intrude on the interpretations of the state, so long as 
they are within a certain “zone of legality”.21 For one the question is whether the right 
balance was struck by the national organ between the individual and public interests – or at 
least whether the right things were taken into considerations when the balancing was taking 
place. For the other it is the question of what the right balance of oversight of the ECtHR 
over national organs is and the balancing of individual with public interests and its proper 
execution, if at all on the agenda, comes in second.  
The argument proceeds as follows: I first start by outlining two ideal types of 
narratives about the role of courts – the so-called international and constitutional using 
Letsas’22 early insight into the operation of the margin of appreciation (1). I then continue by 
using literature analysis of recent case-law where the margin of appreciation has been the 
deciding factor in the Court’s deliberations, most notably the Lautsi and Hurst Section and 
Chamber judgements and put these ideal types to bear on the Court’s argumentation (2). In 
conclusion I argue that the problem that the current doctrine of the margin of appreciation is 
facing stems from the unresolved transition through which the international system is 
currently going and that similar problems for justification and legitimization of court 
judgments will continue to pop up across the court spectrum.  
 
2. TWO IDEAL TYPES OF NARRATIVES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
 
2.1 Courts as International Institutions  
 
Before I go into outlining the “International Ideal” a short note on the concept of ideal 
types as an analytical tool in legal scholarship is needed. Certainly ideal types are not new 
and have been used since the time of Max Weber. Their use in this article are inspired by 
Damaska’s The Faces of Justice23 and their aim is to present the basic necessary elements of 
what international courts would look like if we were to take the nation-centred narrative to its 
logical extreme. It does not purport to be a description of an existing court since that is not its 
purpose; rather its purpose is to highlight the conditions we need to believe in in order to be 
true to the nation-centred narrative or its alternative.  
The narrative of international courts as international institutions is familiar to all 
students of international law not least through the text-book explanations of the relationship 
                                                 
20
 Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and 
Proportionality (Oxford University Press 2012). 
21
 For this second view on a margin of appreciation see Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 907. 
22
 Letsas calls his two concepts substantive and structural however, for the sake of clarity I will call them the 
international and constitutional, see George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, p. 706. 
23
 Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority : A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(Yale University Press 1986). 
between international law and municipal law and, as such, it derives from the basic 
assumptions of the international system itself.
24
 The system as it is traditionally conceived is 
one of sovereign and equal states
25
 where the sates are equal in their rights and duties,
26
 at 
least in an original position (their rights and duties might change subject to self-restriction 
e.g. entering into treaties). The idea of sovereignty implies that states are independent and 
have a freedom of action unless there is rule constraining this freedom.
27
 Sovereignty also 
means that states are, ultimately, the source of all law, either through treaties, customs (which 
are state practice coupled with the opinio juris of states) or general principles of law found 
common to the various municipal systems.
28
  
Sovereign equality also dictates the general principles of the relationship between 
international and domestic law. In the classical sense international and national law are 
separate systems with their own mechanisms of law-making and law application and different 
notions of what makes for legitimate law. Moreover, “international law does not itself 
prescribe how it should be applied or enforced at the national level”29 (to do so would be to 
prescribe a form of political system to states, something that does not jibe well with the post 
WWII notion of the international system
30
) and as such it only looks at results i.e. whether a 
state complies or not with its international obligations regardless of how it implements those 
domestically.
31
 Moreover, a state cannot disregard its international obligations due to its 
incompatibility with municipal law.
32
 However, this does not imply that international law 
requires monism for that would be a requirement of means (making international law higher 
than domestic law in national settings through some sort of constitutional arrangement) rather 
than results. As such, it is not inconceivable that a certain action would be legal and 
legitimate domestically but illegal internationally.
33
  
This basic structure has certain implications about how courts should position 
themselves vis-à-vis states. For one, international courts, when deciding upon issues of law 
have to connect their decisions to the consent of states, hence the structure of Article 38 
sources
34
 where scholars and judicial decisions are only authorities, evidence of the law but 
never the law. Therefore, judicial decisions cannot be precedents because that would imply 
that courts are law-making institutions – a judicial decision only has force as between the 
parties of a dispute and cannot be a source of law for other disputes and states.
35
 Moreover, 
the decoupled relationship between international and municipal law dictates how 
international courts view municipal law. It has been a long standing adage that municipal law, 
when it comes before international courts, is considered as a fact not as law.
36
 It is considered 
as a fact for a simple reason, it is not the international court’s law, it cannot interpret or re-
interpret it – it cannot save it from being incompatible with international law by re-
                                                 
24
 For a rundown of the traditional four criteria for courts in general as applied to international courts see 
Chapter 9 of José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press 2005) p. 
521-527. 
25
 For an historical view of how the sovereign equality came to represent the current structure of the 
international system see Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 
537. 
26
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 211-215. 
27
 Ibid p. 211-212 but also see Nuclear Weapons Case and Kosovo Advisory Opinion  
28
 Ibid p. ; Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed. edn, Oxford University Press 2010) p. 
29
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law  p. but also see Malcolm D. Evans, International Law p. 
30
 Generally see Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’. 
31
 This has been confirmed as late as 2009 in the Avena II judgment  
32
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law p. 131-138;and Malcolm D. Evans, International Law p. 413-415. 
33
 Again Avena II judgment illustrates this quite clearly. 
34
 ICJ statute.  
35
 Article 59 ICJ statute.  
36
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law p. 136-137. 
interpreting it in light of international law (like e.g. the German Constitutional Court can 
interpret the Basic Law in light of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
37
) – but can only take it as 
it is interpreted and applied by national courts. “It is French legislation, as applied in France, 
which really constitutes French law and if that law does not prevent the fulfilment of the 
obligations in France […], the fact that the terms of legislative provisions are capable of a 
different construction is irrelevant”38 as the PCIJ said. It’s their law and not ‘ours’ to meddle 
with. Put differently 
From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, 
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of 
States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures. The 
Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but there is 
nothing to prevent the Court’s giving judgment on the question whether or not, in 
applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards 
Germany under [international law].
39
 
Moreover, the emphasis on sovereign equality also has some implication on the 
methods of interpretation. For instance, similarly to the criminal law principle of in dubio pro 
reo (when in doubt, for the accused) international law has its version of ‘restrictive’ 
interpretation
40
 which in its post WWII form is restrictive in favour of state sovereignty.
41
 If a 
provision is unclear then the default assumption is that states are jealous of their sovereignty 
and would want to constrict their freedom of action to the least possible extent. Another 
illustration when it comes to rules of interpretation is the obsession with treaty text for it is – 
according to the ILC at least
42
 – the text of the treaty that embodies the objective will of the 
parties and therefore, all interpretations should be argued through the text, put into context 
(context narrowly understood as in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention) and in light of 
the treaty’s object and purpose. Even the documents that are to be considered context have to 
have been agreed by the parties, either explicitly or implicitly. 
All of this has implications for the margin of appreciation doctrine. For instance, the 
recurrent phrase of the ECtHR – that it is not up to the Court to substitute its finding of fact 
and the application of the law to the facts of a domestic court with its own view but only to 
determine whether this application of the law to facts was in compliance with the convention 
– should be understood in this light.43 The Court is not doing a type of review that is akin to 
certain national High Courts that also do not go into fact finding but only do a review of the 
proper interpretation and understanding of the law (like the Cour de Casassion in France or 
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 Birgit Peters, ‘Germany’s Dialogue with Strasbourg: Extrapolating the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention Decision ’ (2012) 13 
German Law Journal 757. 
38
 Serbian Loans, Judgment No. 14, 1929, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 20 p. 46-47. 
39
 Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The merits), Judgment No. 7, 1926, PCIJ, 
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40
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New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(S)’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 681. 
41
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expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the 
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties.” 
Commentaries to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, p. 220, para. 11, 1966. 
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even the US Supreme Court that works only from a record created by the lower courts)
44
 but 
it is rather being faithful to its international law roots. It is a difference in kind not of degree – 
the ECtHR does not see national law as its law, for otherwise it would see it fit to tell what 
the meaning of the national law should be as required by the convention rather than leaving 
the states to figure it out for themselves.  
Moreover, when it comes to interpretation the states are the ones who have the 
primary right and responsibility to interpret international law. This implies that an 
international court needs to be mindful of state practice when interpreting treaties as per 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In its most recent meeting 
the International Law Commission taxed with exploring the question of subsequent practice 
proposed in its Conclusion 2 that “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under 
article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), being objective evidence of the understanding of the 
parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the 
application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31.”45 Authentic 
interpretation in this sense needs to be contrasted to authoritative, the later belonging to 
international courts. In national law authentic interpretations stems from the original law 
giver itself, mostly either from Parliament or one of its standing committees. In international 
law, the state parties’ interpretation presents the authentic interpretation (as the original 
lawgivers) although it is “not necessarily binding”46 but “may assist in determining whether 
or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a 
term used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time.”47 It is in this light that we have 
to put the margin of appreciation’s consensus search, as a search for subsequent practice 
especially in the face of evolving standards.
48
 
To put it with a small dose of caricature, and international court should behave like a 
permanent arbitration mechanism where the judges come pre-selected and the parties can 
simply concentrate on arguing their case. Since the courts cannot create general rules, nor 
make precedents, every case should be considered without reference to previous cases. 
 
2.2. The Constitutional Ideal 
 
 
Before I go on to discuss this ideal type, I wish to make one caveat clear. When I use 
the term “constitutional ideal” I do not mean to sketch the ideal institutional setting for a 
Constitutionalized international order – this is not a study of Constitutionalization of 
international law, there are others who have done that previously and in a better way that I 
can do at this time.
49
 Rather what I will present here is a sketch of what a constitutional court 
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Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2009; Jan Klabbers, 
Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International La; Mattias Kumm, ‘The 
(not a specific one) that does not conduct abstract review of law but reviews constitutionality 
on a case-by-case basis should do, or rather does. The reason for this is that, as it currently 
stands, the ECtHR (or any other human rights court) does not do abstract review, although 
advisory opinions come close since they are not tied to a specific case but to a specific issue 
(e.g. whether reservations are compatible with the Genocide Convention) but do, however, 
differ since it does not compare in abstract the meaning of two norms – there is always an 
issue (a concrete although sometimes hypothetical act) at hand.  
The first thing that comes to mind regarding an idea of constitutional review is that a 
constitutional court (or a High Court by any other name) is embedded within a constitutional 
structure be it written or not. It is part of a national legal and institutional system and sits at 
the apex of a judicial pyramid. In countries such as France, there might be a dual or even a 
triple judicial pyramid each judicial structure having jurisdiction over a specific topic area 
(Conseil d’Etat in administrative law, Cour de Cassation in Civil Law and Conseil 
Constitutionnel in constitutional law proper).
50
 All of these courts can do rights review to a 
certain extent even though it is not called constitutional review as such, but rather review of 
conventionalité compliance of national law with the ECHR.
51
  
For the sake of clarity, and ideal constitutional model would be one where there is one 
court tasked with doing constitutional review, part of its cases devoted to rights review. It 
may combine abstract review with concrete review (based on individual cases). It would be 
part of a constitutional structure with a separation of powers but it may or may not be 
embedded in a system of checks-and-balances but have different type of relationship with the 
other branches (parliamentary sovereignty, cooperation and coordination rather than strict 
checks and balances) and is not dependent on the type of remedies that it can award, either 
open or “hard” remedies.52 What is crucial is that there are certain norms, either written in a 
special document or dispersed through the legal system but considered to be hierarchically 
superior than others for which the courts and as such the highest court can judge on the 
compatibility of ordinary norms with superior ones.  
This type of system has implications for the way that a High Court positions itself to 
other national courts as well as to the other constitutional branches. First of all, there would 
be a clearer set of rules that set out the relationship between the court and the other branches, 
which it will be called upon to police. More importantly for our purposes is that it can do 
rights review, i.e. that it can adjudicate whether a proper balance between public interests and 
civil/human rights has been struck by the other branches (as well as other actors in society).
53
 
In conducting this type of review a High Court would have recourse to several doctrines of 
deference chief among them the proportionality test which can take several forms one being 
the proportionality test as used by the ECtHR.
54
 Through proportionality tests the main task 
of a High Court would be to scrutinise whether the authority that has initially taken a certain 
action (this could also include enacting legislation) has made a proper balance between the 
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public interests and the individual right while employing adequate means.
55
 The standards of 
review can be a simple reasonableness test, which implies a very high deference, to a 
heightened scrutiny which implies a very low level of deference. The proportionality test that 
the ECtHR uses can be used on a sliding scale that can denote both a reasonableness standard 
and a heightened scrutiny standard. Rather than showing deference because of the 
sovereignty or democratic pedigree of the institution at hand, the deference is, rather, shown 
because of greater expertise of the body or because the constitutional arrangement puts the 
discretion of such a decision in the hands of the institution which act is under review. This 
does not mean that “anything goes” just because that institution has a constitutional power to 
regulate in a certain sphere, it still has to do so in a manner that does not unduly infringe on 
rights. 
In a national setting a High Court (even ordinary courts) can interpret and re-interpret 
national law and point the deficiencies of reasoning of other institutions, including 
parliaments. Moreover, they can also interpret international law (the opposite is not the case 
they do not take international law to be only a fact but consider the possible interpretations of 
international law)
56
 and present their interpretation as being an authentic interpretation albeit 





3. That Slippery Doctrine 
 
In its early incarnation, the margin of appreciation doctrine was imported from the 
French Conseil d’Etat, although similar deference doctrines exist in most Continental 
administrative law systems, with the German being the most elaborate.
58
 In most systems 
where rights review exists there is some sort of a deference doctrine in use since most of the 
time it involves issues where executive organs make first instance decisions acting with a 
certain prescribed limits of discretion and courts, as mechanisms of oversight, do not wish to 
substitute their judgment with that of the organs – within reason. Depending on the type of 
organ and the type of issue at hand (whether it is an administrative or a legislative organ, 
whether it is exercising functions granted to it by a Constitution or statute for example) there 
is a wider or narrower room for deference. 
Unfortunately for the ECtHR, importing a domestic deference doctrine within its 
deliberations – even one that is part and parcel of rights jurisprudence – caries problems since 
we can hardly call the ECtHR a national or a constitutional court embedded within a 
constitutional system. Consequently, the margin of appreciation doctrine has found itself to 
be in the midst of a tug-of-war – is it to be a familiar type of deference doctrine of the rights 
litigation kind or is it to be a something more, a deference doctrine suited for a world of 
sovereign nation states? In the next pages I will show this tug-of-war by through literature 
analysis of the reasoning of two controversial judgments, the Hirst and the Lautsi Section and 
Grand Chamber judgments to show how the influence of the two identities of the ECtHR, the 
constitutional and the international, shape the discussion around the margin.  
                                                 
55
 ibid p. 74-77. 
56
 A good example of this was the Pinchet I and III cases where the UK House of Lords had to interpret the 
Convention on the Prevention of Torture as well as the way it had been incorporated into national law.  
57
 This then becomes something to be considered by other international and national actors that also interpret 
international law see for instance André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law 
(Oxford University Press 2011) as for a pluralist setting of international law see Nico Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law 
58
 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the Echr (Intersentia 2002), p.  
The Lautsi case revolved around the issue of whether mandating the placement of the 
crucifix in public schools violates the parents’ right to education under Article 2, Protocol 1. 
The Chamber took a very noticeable constitutional rights review approach. It started with 
listing the principles behind Art. 2, P. 1 built up over the years through the Courts case-law. It 
said that:  
It is on to the fundamental right to education that is grafted the right of parents to 
respect for their religious and philosophical convictions … [that it] aims at 
safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education which possibility is essential 
for the preservation of the “democratic society” as conceived by the Convention … 
[that the respect] for [the] parents' convictions must be possible in the context of 
education capable of ensuring an open school environment which encourages 
inclusion rather than exclusion, regardless of the pupils’ social background, religious 
beliefs or ethnic origins. Schools should not be the arena for missionary activities or 
preaching … [that the] State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to 
education and teaching, must take care that information or knowledge included in 
the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State 
is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not 
respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions. That is the limit that 
must not be exceeded [and that the] [r]espect for parents’ religious convictions and 
for children’s beliefs implies the right to believe in a religion or not to believe in any 
religion [and that the] State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with 
any kind of power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious convictions or the 





In the application of the principles the Chamber said that  
 
the Court must consider whether the respondent State, when imposing the display 
of crucifixes in classrooms, ensured that in exercising its functions of educating and 
teaching knowledge was passed on in an objective, critical and pluralist way, and 
respected the religious and philosophical convictions of parents … [that] [i]n order 
to examine that question, the Court will take into account in particular the nature of 
the religious symbol and its impact on young pupils, especially the applicant's 
children, because in countries where the great majority of the population owe 
allegiance to one particular religion the manifestation of the observances and 
symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, may constitute 
pressure on students who do not practise that religion or those who adhere to another 
religion … [that] the symbol of the crucifix has a number of meanings among which 
the religious meaning is predominant, [that] [t]he presence of the crucifix may easily 
be interpreted by pupils of all ages as a religious sign, and they will feel that they 
have been brought up in a school environment marked by a particular religion. What 
may be encouraging for some religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for 
pupils of other religions or those who profess no religion. That risk is particularly 
strong among pupils belonging to religious minorities. Negative freedom of religion 
is not restricted to the absence of religious services or religious education. It extends 
to practices and symbols expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, a religion or 
atheism. That negative right deserves special protection if it is the State which 
expresses a belief and dissenters are placed in a situation from which they cannot 
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extract themselves if not by making disproportionate efforts and acts of sacrifice 
[and that] [t]he Court cannot see how the display in state-school classrooms of a 
symbol that it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism (the majority religion in 
Italy) could serve the educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of 
“democratic society” within the Convention meaning of that term. [And finally] 
[t]he Court considers that the compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in 
the exercise of public authority … restricts the right of parents to educate their 
children in conformity with their convictions and the right of schoolchildren to 
believe or not believe. It is of the opinion that the practice infringes those rights 
because the restrictions are incompatible with the State's duty to respect neutrality in 




It is a long read I know, but this is to show that there was nothing extraordinary in the 
Chamber’s reasoning, nothing extraordinary that is for a Supreme or Constitutional court 
rights review. It focused on the general principles deduced from the nature of the right in 
question and the Court’s own case law; it paid homage to the purposes of the founding 
document, the preservation of a pluralistic and democratic society; it emphasized the State’s 
duty of neutrality between the competing belief systems, and securing an individual’s right to 
educate one’s children in one’s belief system. It talked about the possible impact of the 
symbol of the cross on young children and their possible feeling of exclusion in relation to 
the State’s duty to provide a neutral and plural education system free of indoctrination (taken 
together it has somewhat of an oxymoronic feeling to it but …). In short, a text-book case of 
Con Law 101 argumentation on the separation of church and state. It did not, however, 
mention the margin of appreciation doctrine even though the Government argued for it.
61
 
Nevertheless, given the Court’s description of the margin of appreciation, namely: “that [t]he 
scope of this margin of appreciation is not identical in each case but will vary according to 
the context [… and that] [r]elevant factors include the nature of the Convention right in issue, 
its importance for the individual and the nature of the activities concerned”62 one can argue 
that the Chamber did in fact do a margin of appreciation analysis, it just did not invoke it 
specifically, it did not argue through the language of the “prongs” of the margin of 
appreciation “test” even though it looked at the importance of the convention right (for a 
plural and a democratic society), the impact to the individual (feeling of exclusion) and the 
nature of the activities concerned (learning under the cross in a public school).
63
 Moreover, 
notice that this description (and this is one of several descriptions) of the margin is a typical 
description of the balancing of rights with public interests (nature of the right and its 
importance for individual autonomy, and the nature of the activities of the public organ i.e. 
the nature of the public interest at stake). Assign different values for each question and in the 
end you have your balancing on a scale – the scale tips this way or dependent on the value of 
each element added for the individual or for the public interest.   
We can compare this type of reasoning to the case that is most similar to Lautsi the 
German Classroom Crucifix II Case which revolved around the issue of a Bavarian school 
ordinance which mandated the display of the crucifix in every elementary school classroom.
64
 
Rather than deciding under the rubric of the right to education, the Federal Constitutional 
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Court (FCC) decided the case on freedom of religion grounds. However, the similarity in 
justification should be noted. For instance, in its opinion the FCC, when discussing the role of 
the state in relation to religion said that  
Article 4(1) does not simply command the state to refrain for interfering in the 
faith commitments of individuals or religious communities. It also obliges the state to 
secure for them a realm of freedom in which they can realize their personalities 
within an ideological and religious context. The state is thus committed to protect the 
individual from attacks or obstructions by adherents of different beliefs or competing 
religious groups. Article 4(1), however, grants neither to the individual nor to the 
religious communities the right to have their faith commitments supported by the 
state. On the contrary, freedom of faith as guaranteed by Article 4(1) of the Basic 
Law requires the state to remain neutral in matters of faith and religion. […] it must 
take care not to identify itself with a particular community.
65
 
Moreover, the Court went out of its way to emphasize the difference in circumstances 
between the exposure to religious festivities or symbols of the majority religion in the public 
square from those imposed by the state at state institutions where “students who do not share 
the same faith are unable to remove themselves from its presence and message.”66 While “no 
state, even one that universally guarantees freedom of religion and is committed to religious 
and ideological neutrality, is in position to completely divest itself of the cultural and 
historical values on which social cohesion and attainment of public goals depend” 
nevertheless, even when it is permitted for the state to introduce Christian values in schools, 
“this presupposes […] that coercion is reduced to an indispensable minimum” and that “the 
school must not proselytize on behalf of a particular religious doctrine or actively promote the 
tenets of” a faith.67 Furthermore, “[i]n a pluralistic society […] the state, in setting up a 
system of compulsory public school instruction, cannot possibly satisfy all educational goals 
or needs” nevertheless “in resolving the inevitable tension between the negative and positive 
aspects of religious freedom, and in seeking to promote the tolerance that the Basic Law 
mandates, the state, in forming the public will, must strive to bring about an acceptable 
compromise” while at the same time “foster[ing] the autonomous thinking that Article 4 […] 
secures within the religious and ideological realms”.68  
And finally, 
Parents and pupils who adhere to the Christian faith cannot justify the display of 
the cross by invoking their positive freedom of religious liberty. All parents and 
pupils are equally entitled to the positive freedom of faith, not just Christian parents 
and pupils. The resulting conflict cannot be resolved on the basis of majority rule 
since the constitutional right to freedom of faith is particularly designed to protect 
the rights of religious minorities. Moreover, Article 4(1) does not provide the 
holders of the constitutional right with an unrestricted right to affirm their faith 
commitments within the framework of public institutions. […] in all of these 
[religious] activities must be conducted on a voluntary basis and the school must 
ensure that students who do not wish to participate in these activities are excused 
from them and suffer no discrimination because of their decision not to participate. 
The situation is different with respect to the display of the cross. Students who do 
not share the same faith are unable to remove themselves from its presence and 
message. […] it would be incompatible with the principle of practical concordance 
to suppress completely the feelings of people of different beliefs in order to enable 
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the pupils of Christian beliefs not only to have religious instruction and voluntary 
prayer in the public schools, but also to learn under the symbol of their faith even 




My point with this comparison is not to say that the Section “got it right” and the 
Grand Chamber “got it wrong”70 or that there is only one way of deciding this issue. My 
point is that, unlike the Grand Chamber’s analysis, which follows bellow, constitutional 
courts care a great deal about whether an institution, while following its constitutionally 
granted powers, makes the correct or nearly correct balancing between public and 
majoritarian interests and individual rights and interests. In this sense it does not matter much 
if the act at hand is a dully promulgated law of a the democratically elected representative 
organ acting under the powers granted to it by the federal constitution, for it is not a question 
of whether that organ has acted under its sovereign powers but whether it has struck the 
proper balance between competing public (majoritarian) and private (individual) interests and 
this is regardless of whether other federal entities have done the same or similar things. It’s a 
difference in mind-set rather than semantics. It is no surprise that Justice De Meyer says that  
 
It is possible to envisage a margin of appreciation in certain domains. It is, for 
example, entirely natural for a criminal court to determine sentence - within the 
range of penalties laid down by the legislature - according to its assessment of the 
seriousness of the case. But where human rights are concerned, there is no room for a 
margin of appreciation which would enable the States to decide what is acceptable 
and what is not. […] It is for the Court, not each State individually, to decide that 
issue, and the Court’s views must apply to everyone within the jurisdiction of each 
State. 
 
It is no surprise since he sees the Court as the constitutional court of Europe. And that would 
be the Court’s task had it been the constitutional court of Europe but since it also has to 
struggle with its international identity things are more complicated than that and other 
structural issues have to be taken into account.  
Now let us turn to the Grand Chamber. In the discussion on general principles it said 
that Art. 2 of P. 1 
 should be read in the light not only of the first sentence of the same Article, but 
also, in particular, of Article 9 of the Convention […], which guarantees freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom not to belong to a religion, 
and which imposes on Contracting States a “duty of neutrality and impartiality” 
[and] [i]n that connection, […] States have [the] responsibility for ensuring, 
neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs. Their 
role is to help maintain public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a 
democratic society, particularly between opposing groups […] the requirements of 
the notion of “respect”, […] vary considerably from case to case, given the diversity 
of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States. As a 
result, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the 
steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the 
needs and resources of the community and of individuals. In the context of Article 2 
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interpreted to mean that parents can require the State to provide a particular form of 
teaching […] [and] the setting and planning of the curriculum fall within the 
competence of the Contracting States. In principle it is not for the Court to rule on 
such questions, as the solutions may legitimately vary according to the country and 
the era [and moreover] does not prevent States from imparting through teaching or 
education information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or 
philosophical kind. It does not even permit parents to object to the integration of 
such teaching or education in the school curriculum. On the other hand, as its aim is 
to safeguard the possibility of pluralism in education, it requires the State, in 
exercising its functions with regard to education and teaching, to take care that 
information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, 
critical and pluralistic manner, enabling pupils to develop a critical mind particularly 
with regard to religion in a calm atmosphere free of any proselytism. The State is 
forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not 
respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions. That is the limit that the 
States must not exceed.
71
 
When it came to apply the principles the relevant case at hand it said that the State had 
a duty to respect the rights of the parents to “ensure the education and teaching of their 
children in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”, that the 
“crucifix is above all a religious symbol” that “[t]here is no evidence before the Court that the 
display of a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it 
cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young persons whose 
convictions are still in the process of being formed” and that be that as it may “the applicant's 
subjective perception is not in itself sufficient to establish a breach”. Furthermore, even 
though the decision on whether to perpetuate or not a tradition “falls in principle within the 
margin of appreciation” that in itself “cannot relieve a Contracting State of its obligation to 
respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention and its Protocols”. However, it 
also said that “[t]he fact remains that the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in 
their efforts to reconcile exercise of the functions they assume in relation to education and 
teaching with respect for the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions” even though it “goes hand 
in hand with European supervision” and that “[t]he Court therefore has a duty in principle to 
respect the Contracting States’ decisions in these matters, including the place they accord to 
religion, provided that those decisions do not lead to a form of indoctrination.” Placing the 
cross in a classroom, though, does not amount to indoctrination because “a crucifix on a wall 
is an essentially passive symbol” and it “cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils 
comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities.”72  
On the point of the margin of appreciation and the proper role of the Court the Grand 
Chamber said that the “Court must […] take into account the fact that Europe is marked by a 
great diversity between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the sphere of 
cultural and historical development” that it “therefore has a duty in principle to respect the 
Contracting States’ decisions in these matters [of education and building a curriculum], 
including the place they accord to religion, provided that those decisions do not lead to a 
form of indoctrination” and that that “the decision whether crucifixes should be present in 
State-school classrooms is, in principle, a matter falling within the margin of appreciation of 
the respondent State. Moreover, the fact that there is no European consensus on the question 
of the presence of religious symbols in State schools […] speaks in favour of that 
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approach.”73 Distinguishing, or rather differently linking the case of Dahlam (which involved 
Switzerland’s dismissal of a teacher who wore a head scarf in class because it intended to 
protect the pupils’ religious beliefs) and Lautsi the Grand Chamber said that the margin of 
appreciation cuts both ways and that in a field of diverse application like religion in schools 
what matters is not the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the 
individual and the nature of the activities concerned but rather whether the “authorities had 
duly weighed the competing interests involved.”74 It is a hands-off approach, one that looks 
into certain formal requirements of whether the Italian authorities considered the right things 
and not whether they did the right thing. 
Moreover, the concurring opinion of Judge Rozakis makes the head-counting 
manoeuvre more explicit. He starts from re-branding the issue to one not of the right to 
education of children but to the right of the parents weighed with the “right of society, as 
reflected in the authorities’ measure in maintaining crucifixes on the walls of State schools, to 
manifest their (majority) religious beliefs.” In this balancing the question emerges of where 
should the Court stand? According to Judge Rozakis the Court’s answer is straightforward 
“from the part dealing with the overview of law and practice in the member States of the 
Council of Europe with regard to the presence of religious symbols in “State schools” […] [it 
is clear]: there is no consensus among European States” and regarding the proper role of the 
Court  
 
It should be observed here, while we are on the subject of a consensus, that the 
Court is a court of law, not a legislative body. Whenever it embarks on a search for 
the limits of the Convention's protection, it carefully takes into consideration the 
existing degree of protection at the level of the European States; it can, of course, 
afford to develop that protection at a level higher than the one offered by a specific 
respondent State, but on condition that there are strong indications that a great 
number of other European States have already adopted that degree of protection, or 
that there is a clear trend towards an increased level of protection. … In view of the 
fact that there is still a mixed practice among European States on the issue, the only 
remaining guidance for the Court in achieving the correct balance between the 
rights involved comes from its prior case-law. … The question which therefore 
arises at this juncture is whether the display of the crucifix not only affects neutrality 
and impartiality, which it clearly does, but whether the extent of the transgression 
justifies a finding of a violation of the Convention in the circumstances of the 
present case. Here I conclude, not without some hesitation, that it does not. 
(emphasis not in the original)
75
 
The question that begs to be asked here is where did Judge Rozakis’ hesitation come 
from? Surely not from the same case-law that was cited by both the Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber, for as Judge Rozakis states clearly the first thing that one should look at is whether 
there is a mixed practice of European states, for if there isn’t one, if there is a uniform 
practice then the Court’s case-law be damned. What seams compelling is not the strength of 
the Court’s case law either way but the Court’s view of its proper role, for if the Convention 
is the representation of European public order then surely the right question would not be 
whether the Italian authorities (both administrative, legislative and judicial) did some sort of 
reasonable balancing between the rights of the individuals and the religious sentiments of the 
majority, but whether they struck the right balance as required by the Convention. If one 
needs to see a broad consensus on the issue before a right becomes a right then can there be a 






 Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis Joined by Judge Vajic, Lautsi Grand Chamber Judgment. 
greater consensus than the ratification of the Protocol? Would a court of law take an opinion 
poll before deciding what the law is?
76
 But even Judge Rozakis’ opinion does not take the 
lack of a European consensus as the sole and only issue that counts, but rather the one that 
tips the scales for the review of case-law and the principles enshrined therein do matter since 
they are the “remaining guidance” for adopting a higher protection than the one a State offers. 
And this is the critical point for it asks the question of who sets the minimum standard of 
protection, the states or the Court? If it is the Court then it does not matter that a majority of 
states do not fulfil that standard but whether that standard is a plausible interpretation of the 
convention rights. If it is the states, than the only way that the Court can raise the standards of 
protection is if it follows a trend of state practice. If it is a court tasked with deciding on 
issues of a convention that is the public law of Europe than it can raise the standards of 
protection based on reasoning and methodology that is no different from any other High 
Court (including the living instrument doctrine or something similar) regardless of whether 
the majority of states comply with those standards or not. That was the point of Sir Bratza’s 
comments.  
However, if it is an international court than its interpretation has to be tied to the 
consensus of the member states – their state practice – for anything else would be an 
encroachment of sovereignty and therefore, outside of the Court’s purview. To put it another 
way, this can work in the reverse – if the Central and Eastern European states on mass decide 
to curtail gay rights then that will nullify a pre-existing consensus and would signify a trend 
which would endanger the current case-law of the Court. Would that also translate to a higher 
margin of appreciation for states? Your answer will depend on how you see the ECtHR and 
its proper role but whatever answer you give will run afoul of one of the narratives. It is not 
surprising that Judge Rozakis tries but ultimately falls short of reconciling the two by putting 
the Court’s case law as a residual guidance once the consensus search fails coming only after 
the practice of the state parties regardless of how strong the case law trend is.  
The split personality of the Court is also clearly visible in the Hirst case dealing with 
the right of prisoners to vote. Maybe the best place to start is from the arguments of the UK 
government. The UK Government argued that “the right to vote was not absolute and that a 
wide margin of appreciation was to be allowed to Contracting States in determining the 
conditions under which the right to vote was exercised” that the Chamber “failed to give due 
regard to the extensive variation between Contracting States on the issue of voting by 
convicted prisoners, ranging from no prohibition to bans extending beyond the term of the 
sentence.” Moreover, “the matter had been considered fully by the national courts applying 
the principles of the Convention under the Human Rights Act 1998, yet the Chamber paid 
little attention to this fact while concentrating on the views of a court in another country” 
where the case “was interpreted by domestic courts to which the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation did not apply.” Furthermore, the Chamber “had erred in effectively assessing the 
compatibility of national law in abstracto” that the interference with the right to vote pursued 
“legitimate aims of preventing crime and punishing offenders and enhancing civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law by depriving those who had breached the basic 
rules of society of the right to have a say in the way such rules were made for the duration of 
their sentence.” In addition the “measure was also proportionate as it only affected those who 
had been convicted of crimes sufficiently serious” and as to the charge or arbitrariness in the 
UK’s measure it argued “that, unless the Court were to hold that there was no margin of 
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appreciation at all in this context, it had to be accepted that a line must be drawn 
somewhere.”77  
The logic of the UK argument is clear. First it argues for the margin of appreciation as 
a structural argument, starting from the notion that the right in question was not absolute and 
that a disparity in application at a European level was eminent giving it a wide margin. 
Domestic case-law not part of the implementation of the convention does not and should not 
be considered by the Court since as national authorities they do not use a margin of 
appreciation reasoning and that an international court cannot do in abstracto review 
(invoking the spectre of a Kelsenian Constitutional court) but has to stick to the case at hand. 
However, it still felt compelled to also argue the issue of proportionality and to rebut the 
charge of arbitrariness (although invoking the margin of appreciation at the same time).  
The Court’s answer, albeit rather long, was in essence to confirm the Chamber’s 
reasoning. It said that right to vote, as found in Art. 3 of P. 1 “guarantees individual rights, 
including the right to vote and to stand for election” and it went on to “highlight the 
importance of democratic principles underlying the interpretation and application of the 
Convention” by saying that the rights at issue in this case “are crucial to establishing and 
maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule 
of law. Therefore, “the right to vote is not a privilege” and “[u]niversal suffrage has become 
the basic principle.” Nevertheless, “[t]here are numerous ways of organising and running 
electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural 
diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould 
into their own democratic vision.” However, it is, “for the Court to determine in the last 
resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it 
has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as 
to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness;.” The operative test in 
this case, as developed by the Court’s case-law is “namely, the legitimacy of the aim and the 
proportionality of the measure.”78 Applied to the case, the Court acknowledged that the 
ground cited by the UK government fall within the legitimate aims that can be pursued by a 
State and went on to consider the issue of proportionality. Regarding the issue of 
proportionality, the Court noted that the number of people striped of their vote was 
substantive, that the issue was not substantially considered by the British Parliament, that the 
national courts deferred to Parliament’s assessment and that, therefore, the British Parliament 
did not manage to sufficiently distinguish between categories of prisoners and offenders, in 
other words did not narrowly tailor its means of achieving the legitimate aim so sought.
79
 So 
far so good, the proportionality review in its essence. It, nevertheless, still decided to do a 
margin of appreciation analysis, or at least a margin of appreciation argument. Responding 
the UK’s claim of a wide margin it said that a) “that it is a minority of Contracting States in 
which a blanket restriction on the right of convicted prisoners to vote is imposed or in which 
there is no provision allowing prisoners to vote (13); and b) “even if no common European 
approach to the problem can be discerned, this cannot in itself be determinative of the issue.” 
“Therefore, while the Court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-
embracing.”80 And so much for the margin, since what follows is a typical proportionality 
reasoning by saying that  
 
although the situation was somewhat improved by the 2000 Act which for the 
first time granted the vote to persons detained on remand, section 3 of the 1983 Act 
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remains a blunt instrument. It strips of their Convention right to vote a significant 
category of persons and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The provision 
imposes a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies 
automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and 
irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual 
circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally 





I must admit, there is a slight of hand in my quote of that last sentence from the 
Court’s judgment, for I omitted a section that reads “falling outside any acceptable margin of 
appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as”. The reason for the omission is 
obvious, it is to show that that particular sentence does nothing, contributes nothing, neither 
to the “proportionality” nor to the “margin” review of the court. Absent that sentence, the 
standard of review would be the typical, run-of-the-mill “reasonableness” or “rational basis” 
standard employed in constitutional rights review. The concurring opinions say as much 
when they say “[i]n other, more general words, more would have been said by asserting that 
measures of exclusion must be “reasonable” than by referring to a “wide” margin of 
appreciation”82 and “[t]he lack of a rational basis for that provision is a sufficient reason for 
finding a violation of the Convention, without there being any need to conduct a detailed 
examination of the question of proportionality.”83  
But once it is understood what that sentence does not do, one understands what it is 
supposed to do and what it is supposed to do is to show that the court made a structural 
argumentation regarding the margin of appreciation where the lack of a common standard 
and the “wideness” of the margin was deflected and where it has sought to show that despite 
the existence of this “wide” margin the UK measure is still beyond it. But what brings it 
beyond is never stated since a normal proportionality review is what the Court is left with.  
And what brings it in the margin of appreciation side of the review is something that 
the dissenting opinion
84
 does in its reasoning. They start with their argumentation by 
realigning the issue for the court, for what the dissenters see in the restriction of the right to 
vote of prisoners as being nothing different from other restrictions “on the right to vote that 
are of a general character, provided that they are not arbitrary and do not affect “the free 
expression of the opinion of the people”, examples being conditions concerning age, 
nationality, or residence.”85 In here, prisoners are no different from minors, immigrants or 
emigrants – they have no say in the way the polity is run. They further continue in their re-
characterisation by making the issue of the margin as an issue of the proper role of the Court 
especially in “developing human rights and the necessity to maintain a dynamic and evolutive 
approach in its interpretation of the Convention and its Protocols in order to make reforms or 
improvements possible” and, after citing several judgments, by saying that “[t]he majority 
have not made reference to this case-law, but that does not in our opinion change the reality 
of the situation that their conclusion is in fact based on a “dynamic and evolutive” 
interpretation of” Art. 3 P.1.86 Even though they do not dispute the “important task for the 
Court to ensure that the rights guaranteed by the Convention system comply with “present-
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day conditions”, for them it is, nevertheless, “essential to bear in mind that the Court is not a 
legislator and should be careful not to assume legislative functions. An “evolutive” or 
“dynamic” interpretation should have a sufficient basis in changing conditions in the societies 
of the Contracting States, including an emerging consensus as to the standards to be 
achieved.”87 And this is where the crux of the matter lay for what is important for evolutive 
interpretation is that it should follow state practice (and not any state practice but a 
conclusive one) – hence the head count. After all it is an “authentic interpretation” of the 
convention, or as close to it as the Court would get. It is not only the fact that the Court is not 
a legislature but it is not even a national or heavens forbid a Constitutional court, for if it 
were a national or a Constitutional court it would not be a problem for it to interpret 
evolutively and it would not be such a big “sin” since some European countries have express 
authorizations in their laws that courts can interpret evolutively (“in Switzerland, the civil 
code instructs judges that when all aids to interpretation fail, they should employ the rule they 
would adopt if they were a legislator”88) while in others it is a matter of practice (for instance 
the German Constitutional Court has the doctrine of the limits of the wording).
89
 To commit 
the sin of interpreting evolutively without grounding that interpretation in state practice in 
international law is to commit the sin of pretending to be nothing more and nothing less than 
a “normal” court – to play the game according to the specifications and limits set out by the 
different topics of law, to practice law pure and simple (pun intended for nothing in law is 
neither pure nor simple) with all the prejudices and all the baggage that that implies. To 
imply differently – to say that international courts are not like normal courts – is to imply that 
international law is not law since it is something altogether different in kind than national law 
or that international law is law but that international courts are not there to “do law” but to do 
something else, like coordinate or fix “collective action problems” where the burden of fixing 
these problems does not come at the burden of sovereignty, at least not beyond what was 
originally agreed. 
However, there is one more curious thing to point out and that is that even the critic of 
the Court’s use of evolutive interpretation is made from the viewpoint of a constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine – the Court is usurping the power of the imagined legislator as 
if there was such a thing in international law. Using a separation of powers argument, an 
argument that is quite familiar from national law debates,
90
 puts us back on the familiar 
footing of constitutional domains and shows how difficult it is to separate the adjudication of 
rights from constitutional notions – isn’t rights review a constitutional matter par excellence? 
It is this problem of mentally categorizing and linking one activity (rights review) with 
certain types of categories (constitutions, rights, public interest, individual autonomy) that 
brings instability to the margin of appreciation doctrine that cannot be easily cured by simply 
the Court giving in to its gentile nature and becoming a constitutional court of Europe
91
 for at 
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the same time it also has to struggle with its international identity which creates other types of 
mental linkages like sovereignty, democratic deficit, treaties, law as fact etc. The Court has a 
structural problem of competing identities which produce conflicting results in its 
interpretation of the margin of interpretation for however much it struggles it will not be able 
to reconcile its split identity and will forever be harassed by its detractors who will think that 
it has either done too much and is acting as a court proper and not an international body 
which has intruded into the sovereign domain of a democratic legislature, or it has done too 
little because it has allowed a state to get away with a controversial action or has not created a 
uniform standard under the pretence of a margin of appreciation that is owed to states by an 
international court. And both types of criticism would be true if only within the concept of an 
international or a national High Court. In short, damned if you do and damned if you don’t. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The Court has a divided audience as the reform debate has shown.
92
 One the one hand 
it has to engage with discussions and criticisms stemming from official channels, including 
“Strasbourg officials, diplomats and NGOs”.93 Some of these actors are “characterised by an 
unwillingness to discuss thoroughly what the primary functions of the Court could and should 
be, by minimalism, and by a mixture of confusion about, and hostility to and indifference 
towards, constitutionalisation.”94 On the other hand, the Court also has to engage with 
academics (mostly with a legal background) and judges on or off the Court on at least two 
sets of issues: how the Council of Europe can “encourage the institutionalization of those 
national process which reduce the risk of violation of Convention rights […] and […] enable 
them to be effectively addressed at national level”95 and the second of “how the scarce 
judicial resources […] can be deployed with maximum effect”.96 Unfortunately for the 
‘reform movements’ the question of how to improve the functioning of the Court is “limited 
by the Convention framework”97 which again is hampered by the lack of understanding of its 
basic functions. Crucially, “even after over more than half a century, there is still no firm 
consensus on what these [basic functions] are.”98 Nor is one likely to come out soon, I would 
add. Moreover, not all judges (past or present), and especially not all academics, see the 
Convention in a monist, public order paradigm and there are strong national traditions that 




Consequently, it is not only that the Court’s audience has different presuppositions 
about what the Court is supposed to do – this in and of itself is not unusual in the pluralistic 
societies that we live today. Courts have been and are muddling their way through 
increasingly pluralistic societies and while that may explain some instability in the 
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interpretation of different doctrines,
100
 the problem of the ECtHR is much more fundamental 
that that. It is not only that it has a pluralistic audience – most courts do – but it is that it has a 
pluralistic composition as well, with former national judges sitting next to academics, former 
members of the national bureaucracies chiefly from ministries that deal with foreign affairs or 
justice, political appointees and human rights/NGO activists.
101
 In short, it has a divided 
interpretative community. Consequently, it is in this way that we can understand that honest 
debate that goes on in the dissenting and concurring opinions of the Lautsi and Hirst 
judgments, as members of an interpretative community trying to convince the other side of 
the rightness of its interpretation – the rightness of which can only be fully understood once 
we see the Convention from their respective perspectives. Moreover, they will honestly see 
the other side as misguided, ill-informed and simply wrong and their use of the doctrine as a 
“substitute for coherent legal analysis”.102 
This plurality of composition affects how the margin of appreciation is being 
interpreted and constructed case by case. In a national court embedded in historical, political 
and educational structures
103
 professional norms keep the plausible interpretations within 
certain limits – hence the notion of plausible. But once a split identity develops doctrines like 
the margin of appreciation will be elusive – they will be “as slippery as an eel”. It is not 
obvious that this deficiency can be easily remedied with the members of the ECtHR 
“choosing” one identity over another. A simple choice of identities – even if choosing ones 
convictions is in the realm of the possible – will not cut it, simply choosing identities is not 
that easy for there are good reasons for the members of either camp to believe that they are 
right and the other are wrong – no wonder that judgments where the margin of appreciation is 
a deciding factor are followed with strong dissents like in the Hirst and Lautsi judgments. 
Ultimately we may have to accept that a better explanation for why the Court decided on the 
width of the margin one way rather than another to be the Court’s split identity that changes 
with each composition of the Sections or the Grand Chamber regardless of how many factors 
we might identify that may swayed the Court’s reasoning. In short and to the point, it is not a 
problem of doctrine it is a problem of fundamentals, one that cannot be easily overcome.  
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